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This paper shows how the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation is inWuenced by
distributive concerns. With second-best instruments, a higher level of income
redistribution calls for a lower level of Pigouvian taxation. More redistribution
implies that tax collection via the income tax creates higher distortions, which
in turn makes revenues from Pigouvian taxation more valuable. Contrary to
naive intuition, this reduces the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation. The so-
cial planner trades oU environmental tax revenues against the marginal social
damage and accepts a lower tax if the welfare created per dollar is higher. The
paperalsoshowsthattherelationbetweenlevelsofredistributionandPigouvian
taxation is reversed in Vrst-best. It thus highlights that second-best Pigouvian
taxes are very diUerent from their Vrst-best counterpart – despite apparently
identical Vrst order conditions.
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11. Introduction
In June, 2008 The Economist published an article discussing the pros and cons of the oil
price boost over the preceding years. On the one hand, the rise might be considered as “a
gigantic carbon tax” that helped Vghting global warming. On the other hand, it particularly
hurt the poor who spent a considerably higher proportion of their income on fuel than
the rich. Financial compensations for the core demand for energy could help to solve the
issue. However “it seems odd to try to prevent energy use with higher taxes ...and then to
subsidise it” (The Economist, 2008). The article thereby raised the question: how to design
green taxes optimally while accounting for distributive concerns? Rising awareness for
global environmental problems under persisting inequality has increased the salience of that
question. In this paper, I give an answer to it. I focus on the optimal level of environmental
taxation and how it changes with the level of redistribution.
To tackle to problem formally, I employ a simple Mirrlees (1971) income taxation frame-
work that is extended by a consumption externality as in Cremer et al. (1998). Within this
framework, a welfare-optimising government uses non-linear income taxes to redistribute
and Pigouvian taxation to reduce negative externalities as proposed by Pigou (1932). I show
that the two tax design problems are interconnected. In particular, the higher the level of
redistribution, the lower the optimal level of environmental taxation. The tax level has two
determinants. First, the marginal social damage caused by the externality. Second, the cost
of public funds. By those I mean a measure of direct welfare losses associated with marginal
income tax collection. If the government puts more weight on redistribution, it will have to
accept higher cost of public funds. Marginal revenues from the environmental tax are then
more valuable from the government’s point of view. Contrary to naive intuition, this calls
for a lower environmental tax rate. The reason is that the tax rate is at its eXcient level if the
marginal revenues exactly compensate society for the marginal externality that is associated
with the harmful activity. The more valuable the marginal revenues are, the less one needs
to compensate for the marginal externality. To put it another way consider the Pigouvian
tax as a bribe that consumers pay the authorities in order to get allowance for pollution. The
government is willing to accept a lower bribe if its utility per dollar is higher. Exactly this is
the case if the costs of public funds are higher.
In the analysis, the level of redistribution is measured by a parameter that corresponds
to the weight of less productive agents in a social-welfare function. As explained, Pigou-
vian taxation needs to decrease if the parameter increases. The result is reversed, though, if
Vrst-best instruments are available. Without distortions, the costs of public funds actually
decrease in the parameter, as the disutility of the hard-working high-productive agents re-
ceives less weight in the welfare function. Hence the Vrst-best level of Pigouvian taxation
increases if the willingness to redistribute increases.
The main contribution with respect to the existing literature is to draw attention to the
level of Pigouvian taxation. Most of the literature focuses on tax rules and concludes that
the distortions caused by second-best instruments do not alter the tax rules compared to
Vrst-best. I show that, despite the Vrst-best shape of these rules, the second-best level of
Pigouvian taxation in fact depends on the distortions and the available income tax instru-
ments. Also, Pigouvian taxation is lower in second- than in Vrst-best.
2As a second contribution, I analyse a laissez-faire regime that introduces a green tax. To
leave the income distribution untouched, green tax revenues are given back in a lump-sum
fashion, such that every agent’s net tax payment is zero. The lack of monetary transfers
between agents might appeal to policy makers for various reasons. Yet, I show that such a
reform is not Pareto-optimal and that one always needs a welfare judgement to determine
an optimal environmental tax.
Related literature
Sandmo (1975) integrates externality taxation into a Ramsey framework with linear taxation
and Vnds that a Pigouvian term is just added to the standard Ramsey term (“additivity pro-
perty”). The linear model is also used to explore the double-dividend hypothesis, according
to which revenues from Pigouvian taxes may be recycled to reduce pre-existing, distortio-
nary taxes to evoke a second dividend. Surveys include Goulder (1995), Bovenberg (1999),
and Schöb (1997).
This paper contributes to a strand of literature in which Pigouvian taxation meets non-
linear income taxes under asymmetric information (Mirrlees, 1971). Cremer et al. (1998)
show that, under the separability assumptions from Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), the opti-
mal Pigouvian tax rate is uniform, i.e., it does not discriminate between agents. Gauthier
and Laroque (2009) generalise the insight: a certain part of the second-best problem can be
separated such that Vrst-best rules apply for that part of the problem. Examples include
Pigouvian taxation and the Samuelson Rule. Hellwig (2010) presents a similar result.
Kopczuk (2003), Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), and Kaplow (2006) explicitly analyse externa-
lity taxation. Kaplow (2006) summarises that “simple Vrst-best rules – unmodiVed for labour
supply distortion or distribution – are correct in a natural, basic formulation of the problem.”
My analysis highlights that distribution and distortions have a signiVcant inWuence on envi-
ronmental policy with respect to tax levels, though. For a similar model, Jacobs and de Mooij
(2011, p. 2) Vnd that the “optimal second-best tax on an externality-generating good should
not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds”. The diUerent conclusions are due to
diUerent deVnitions of the cost of public funds.
Last but not least, my analysis relates to the literature on comparative static properties of
non-linear taxation with and without a public good (Weymark, 1987; Brett and Weymark,
2008; Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2010) and to more applied analyses of the question how to
overcome negative distributional eUects of environmental taxes (like Metcalf, 1999; West,
2005; Ekins and Dresner, 2004). For a recent study on the U.S. economy, see Rausch et al.
(2011).
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 states the rule
for optimal internalisation. Section 4 examines properties of tax systems that implement
the optimal allocations and provides the main result on the comparative statics of Pigou-
vian taxation. Section 5 describes optimal internalisation without redistributive transfers.
Section 6 concludes. The Appendix holds proofs and formal results. It also provides a cha-
racterisation of optimal allocations.
32. Model
Production
The model is based on Cremer et al. (1998). It considers three diUerent goods. First, an inter-
mediategoodthatisreferredtoasoutputandisdenotedbyY . Itservesasthenumeraireand
may also be interpreted as money. Second, a clean, completely private consumption good,
C, and third, a dirty consumption good, D. The intermediate good can be transformed into
the consumption goods at a Vxed rate of transformation equal to pC and pD, respectively.
Parameters pC and pD may be interpreted as the producer prices of C and D. The interme-
diate good itself can be produced with a linear technology using labour as the single input
good (but labour is not modelled explicitly). The rate of transformation between labour and
the intermediate good mirrors productivity and is denoted by w. It may be interpreted as
the wage rate.
Households and allocations
There is a continuum of measure one of agents that diUer in exactly one dimension, namely
their productivity, which can be either low or high. An agent’s type is denoted by  2
fL;Hg. The fraction of low-type agents is denoted by  2 (0;1). An allocation A speciVes
levels of (C;D;Y ) for both generic types, i.e., A  (CL;DL;YL;CH;DH;YH). For a given
allocation the utility of an agent of type  is
U(A) = u(C;D)  
Y
w
  (DL + (1   )DH)e: (1)
Function u is continuously diUerentiable three times, strictly increasing, strictly concave,
has nonnegative cross derivatives and satisVes the Inada conditions.1 It represents private
consumption utility. In order to produce Y units of output, an agent has to provide Y=w
units of labour. This provision is associated with a linear disutility. The last term in the
utility function reWects the externality. Independently of his type, every agent suUers from
the overall consumption of the dirty good DL + (1   )DH. The social harm is propor-
tional to total dirty good consumption, and e > 0. From an agent’s point of view, the own
consumption has no negative eUect on the own utility as their single contribution is negli-
gible in comparison to the larger contribution of others. Individual contributions are in fact
zero due to the assumption of a continuum of agents.2
Social planner
This paper takes a normative perspective by examining what a social planner (SP) would do
in order to maximise the social welfare function W, deVned as
W(A) = UL(A) + (1   )UH(A);  2 (0;1);
1Formally, uCD  0 as well as uK ! 1 as K ! 0, and uK ! 0 as K ! 1; for K 2 fC;Dg. The Inada-
conditions are imposed in order to guarantee strictly positive optimal consumption levels. Strict concavity
guarantees unique solutions.
2Externalities of this type were termed “atmospheric” by Meade (1952). A diUerent way to interpret the
mechanism is a public good that is provided by nature (like “fresh air” or “nice atmosphere”) and that is
reduced by the consumption of the dirty good in such a way that only total consumption matters. In the
model presented here the initial amount of this public good would be normalised to zero.
4where A is the allocation. The welfare function is a weighted sum of the generic types’
utilities. The parameter  measures the weight SP puts on the generic low-type agent. If
 = , then W is the utilitarian welfare function. For  = 1, W would be the Rawlsian
welfare function.
The social planner has to take account of some constraints. Overall, the economy cannot
consume more than it produces in terms of output. Furthermore, an exogenous revenue
requirement r has to be met. The resource constraint is
(YL   pCCL   pDDL) + (1   )(YH   pCCH   pDDH)   r  0: (2)
If (2) holds and A  0, then A is feasible. An allocation that maximises W among all feasible
allocations is a Vrst-best allocation.
If the social planner does not observe an agent’s type, not all feasible allocations are im-
plementable. If, for instance, an allocation disadvantages the high-type agents, they might
have an incentive to pretend to be low-types, making it impossible to implement this allo-
cation.3 Thus, under asymmetric information, SP has to ensure that agents do not want to
















An allocation that maximises welfare among all feasible, incentive-compatible allocations is
a second-best allocation.
I restrict the analysis to the case where SP likes to redistribute from high-type agents to
low-type agents.
Assumption 1. Parameters are such that (1   )wH > (1   )wL.
The assumption holds if SP puts a suXciently high welfare weight on low-type agents.
ThelowerwL isrelativetowH, thelower maybe, becausealargediUerenceinproductivity
provides an eXciency argument for making high-types work more than low-types. A low
population share  of low-types makes redistribution in their favour very cheap, hence it
also allows for a low .
Given the shape of u, it is always optimal to produce strictly positive amounts of the
consumption goods rather than abstain from economic activity. Hence the non-negativity
constraint is an issue only with respect to output requirements. It may be the case, though,
that indeed only one type of agents produces output and that the non-negativity constraint
of the other type is binding. In fact, at the Vrst-best allocation under Assumption 1 only
high-type agents work. For second-best, it is ambiguous whether low-type agents work. I
analyse the cases in which they do so. In these, the incentive constraint of high-types is
always binding; low-types’ IC is always slack.
3For a precise notion of implementation and its relation to incentive-compatible allocations see Section 4 and
Appendix B.
53. Optimal Internalisation in First- and Second-Best
This section provides a general property of Pareto-optimal allocations with respect to the
externality. At Vrst sight, the presented rule is identical for Vrst- and second-best allo-
cations. This is the reason why redistribution or distortions are sometimes considered to
have no important inWuence on Pigouvian taxation. In the next step, however, I show in
what way the Vrst- and second-best rules are in fact diUerent. To shorten exposition, I use
the following notation for J;K 2 fC;Dg. uL := u(CL;DL), uL
J := @u(CL;DL)=@JL,
uL
KJ := @2u(CL;DL)=(@KL@JL). Analogous deVnitions apply to uH := u(CH;DH). The
Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint is denoted by . All results in the current
section are derived in Appendix A.
A rule for optimal internalisation
Both Vrst- and second-best allocation feature the property that the marginal rates of sub-
stitution (MRS) between the two consumption goods are the same for both types of agents.
Rather than being equal to the rate of of transformation (namely, producer-price ratio), as


















This is a standard result in the literature. It follows, for instance, from the more general
analysis by Hellwig (2010). It is driven by the separability feature of the utility functions.
Cremer et al. (1998) point out the relation to the famous result in Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), namely that under the given assumptions commodity prices should not be distorted,
and all redistribution can be done within the labour market. The intuition is as follows.
By assumption, all agents have the same consumption pattern.4 Therefore the commodity
demand cannot be used to screen types and commodity taxation cannot contribute to relax
the equity-eXciency trade-oU. Hence there is no point in distorting them.
The intuition is expected to carry over to the case where an externality is introduced. In
fact, as agents are equal in terms of their consumption preferences and their exposure to the
externality, there is no point in treating them diUerently in this respect. Yet, it is no longer
true that redistribution only aUects the labour market. Optimal consumption now depends
on multiplier , which measures the marginal loss in welfare given a marginal increase in
the revenue requirement r. The multiplier is crucially related to redistribution. Also, while
at Vrst sight the above formula is the same for both Vrst- and second-best allocation,  is
diUerent in Vrst- and second-best, and this has signiVcant consequences for the relation bet-
ween the degree of redistribution and the degree of intervention in the commodity market.
The quasi-linearity in labour allows for closed-form solutions for the multiplier  and
makes the dissimilarity between Vrst- and second-best evident at once. It also reveals the










4More precisely, for a given amount of total consumption spending, all agents consume the same commodity
bundle.
6To grasp the intuition, note that agents do not beneVt from r, so an increase is pure bur-
den. A way to Vnance the additional requirement is to increase output. As the incentive
constraint for the high-type agents is binding, their output may only be increased if the
low-type’s output is increased as well. The weighted welfare loss of such an increase is
equal to =wL for the generic low-type and (1   )=wH for the generic high-type. Note
that the multiplier does not depend on the population shares. The reason is that a higher
revenue requirement has to be produced by all agents (and independently of their type) in
order to sustain incentive compatibility.






Because only high-types work in Vrst-best, only parameters related to them matter for the
cost of public funds. If SP needs an additional unit of revenue, he will make high-type agents
work more. As there are only 1    high-type agents, the generic high type has to provide
1=(1 ) (marginal) units of output and needs to work 1=(wH(1 )) additional hours. The
incurred marginal disutility is weighted by 1   .
The multipliers are not only diUerent in size, but also with respect to their directions of
change in the parameters  and . The welfare weight thereby has an impact on the optimal
tax design with respect to the externality. If interpreted naively, the rule itself hides this fact.
4. Taxation
The current section adapts the interpretation of output being money. In this interpretation,
Y denotes gross income, w corresponds to the wage rate, and pC;pD are producer prices.
Now it is possible to introduce taxes and to Vnd tax systems that implement particular allo-
cations.
A tax system  = (tC;tD;T()) consists of an income tax function T and speciVc commo-
dity taxes tC;tD 2 R. Consumer prices are deVned as qK := pK + tK; K 2 fC;Dg. With
T : (w;Y ) 7! T(w;Y ), it is possible to Vnd a system , such that individual maximisation
will result in the Vrst-best allocation. With T : Y 7! T(Y ), it is possible to Vnd a system
, such that individual maximisation will result in the second-best allocation. This insight
allows to restrict attention to the chosen tax structure. (Formal arguments are provided in
appendix B.)







  (DL + (1   )DH)e
s:t: qCC + qDD  Y   T()

: (8)
7As before, the externality is not relevant for an agent’s decision. Let V() denote the hi-
ghest utility an individual agent can achieve given a tax system. In order to internalise and
redistribute optimally, the social planner then needs to Vnd a tax system  that maximises
VL() + (1   )VH()










which is equivalent to the resource constraint (2). In Vrst-best, the income tax may be
contingent on the agent’s type, while in second-best it can only be contingent on observed
gross income Y . T() may be negative, in which case it is a transfer to the agent. Also,
consumption may be subsidised through negative commodity taxes.
4.1. Pigouvian Taxation
This section investigates how the need to internalise the externality shapes the optimal tax
system. At Vrst sight, the tax on the dirty good tD should be the object of interest. However,
the taxation problem does not have a unique solution. It would be possible to normalise one
of the commodity taxes to zero. Yet, this approach suUers from the fact that the normalisa-
tion choice might inWuence the conclusions. Schöb (2003, 1997), for instance, demonstrates
this in the context of the double dividend hypothesis. Therefore I do not use a normalisa-
tion but propose a diUerent concept. I deVne an object g that is uniquely determined by the
implemented allocation and that mirrors the tax system’s inherent incentives to reduce pol-
lution. As it turns out, g coincides with tD if tC is set to zero. Hence, after all, normalising
tC to zero and examining tD is equivalent to my analysis. Still, my approach exposes the full
range of possible commodity tax combinations that yield optimal internalisation.
A tax system’s greenness
Consider an agent who faces some tax system  and decides to purchase an additional unit
of D, while keeping her total spendings constant by reducing her consumption of C. The
reallocation has consequences for the social planner’s tax revenue. This hypothetical change
in revenues is the greenness g of the tax system.
DeVnition 1. The greenness of tax system  = (tC;tD;T) is denoted by g and is deVned as




The greenness is constructed in such a way that individual utility maximisation implies
MRS = (pD + g)=pC. From the agent’s point of view g not only includes what they have
to pay in taxes for additional consumption of D, but also what they save in taxes when
consuming less C. The Pigouvian rationale is to provide agents with the incentive to shift
consumption from D to C. The greenness is an accurate measure of how intense this in-
centive is, and, unlike a particular tax rate, it is independent of the normalisation of the tax
system.
8As a further advantage, the concept of greenness provides the full range of possible inter-
nalisation schemes (given tax structure ). If, for technical or political reasons, one of the
commodity taxes is not available or restricted, the deVnition of g gives an immediate answer
on how to set the other commodity tax in order to reach eXciency.
Still, there is a clear relation between actual taxes and g. In particular, if tC is normalised
to zero, g is simply equal to tD. If tD is normalised to zero then, instead of punishing
consumption of the dirty good, the tax system subsidises consumption of the clean good.
Note that for any tD, one can Vnd a tC such that g equals some desired value.
Rather than speaking of a (single) Pigouvian tax, I use the term Pigouvian taxation when
referring to a tax system’s feature of incentivising agents to reduce an externality. More
precisely, a tax system involves Pigouvian taxation if and only if g > 0.5
EXcient Pigouvian taxation
How high should g be? An optimum is characterised by the fact that a marginal reallocation
doesnotchangewelfare. Inparticular, keepingprivatespendingconstant, amarginalchange
in consumption levels must not change welfare. Consider a marginal shift from C to D (for
all agents, taking account of diUerences in prices). This has three eUects: (1) Consumption
utility u is unchanged as agents are at their individual optimum. (2) External harm increases
at rate e. (3) Tax revenues increase at rate g and relax the budget constraint of the social
planner. The Lagrangian multiplier, , tells how welfare is aUected, because relaxing the
budget constraint is equivalent to reducing the revenue requirement r. Thus the marginal
eUect of tax revenues on welfare amounts to g. The overall marginal change in welfare is





Obviously g is increasing in e. If the externality is a more severe problem, incentives to
lower dirty good consumption should be higher. It is less obvious, though, that g is inversely
proportional to , to which I refer to as the cost of public funds. To grasp the intuition behind
the inverse relation consider the purpose of Pigouvian taxation: its only goal is to restore
the eXcient level of dirty good consumption. From a welfare perspective, a unit of the dirty-
good should be consumed if and only if consumption is not only individually optimal, but
private beneVts also outweigh social harm. Consequently, dirty-good consumption is at its
socially optimal level if marginal private (net) beneVts exactly equal marginal social harm.
To measure and compare these two objects, it is useful to quantify them in terms of money.
(1) The optimising agent is willing to pay g units of additional taxes for the right to
consume her last unit of D rather than spending the respective money on C. So g is a
good measure of (net) private beneVts of the marginal unit of dirty-good consumption.
(2) Now consider the social planner. If D increases by one unit, welfare decreases by e.
If SP receives exactly e= units of money to relax the budget constraint, welfare increases
by (e=) = e. Thus the marginal social harm measured in money is equal to e=. It is
exactly the amount of money that society needs as a compensation for additional dirty-good
consumption. The amount is lower if the received money is more useful in the sense that
5If g < 0, a Pigouvian subsidy is present to correct for a positive externality, i.e., for e < 0
9cost of public funds are higher. Putting together (1) and (2) shows that if g = e= then
individual maximisation leads to an allocation in which, at the margin, private (net) beneVts
equal social harm.
The inverse relation of g and  drives the comparative statics of Pigouvian taxation. While
naive intuition suggests that higher cost of public funds (associated with marginal tax re-
venue being more valuable) should lead to higher Pigouvian tax rates, the above analysis
reveals that the opposite is true. The more valuable the marginal tax revenues, the less is
needed to compensate for the marginal externality, and — because the one and only pur-
pose of Pigouvian taxation is to induce alignment of private beneVts and social harm at the
margin — a lower Pigouvian tax rate is asked for.
A note on the double-dividend hypothesis
The double-dividend hypothesis states that revenues from a Pigouvian tax may be used
to reduce other, distortionary taxes and may thereby entail a positive eUect that exceeds
the environmental beneVts. Consequently, Pigouvian tax revenues are more useful if other
taxes are more distortionary, and — taking the revenues into account — one might want
the Pigouvian tax to be higher in that case. The above discussion reveals, though, why this
reasoning is misleading. First, the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation is based on marginal
considerations only, total revenues are irrelevant. Second, if marginal revenues are more
useful, then, contrary to the double dividend rationale the tax level should be lower.
The strong form of the double-dividend hypothesis states that a revenue-neutral intro-
duction of green taxes is desirable even if environmental beneVts are not taken into account.
Empirical investigations by Goulder (1995) tend to reject the hypothesis. In the model that
I present, it fails clearly: Pigouvian taxation, namely g > 0, is optimal only if an externality
is present, i.e., if e > 0. Bovenberg (1999) gives the same argument, albeit for a model with
linear taxation.
A note on regressive taxes
Environmental taxes are regressive if tax payments in proportion to total consumption spen-
ding decrease in total consumption spending. A tax designer should take this into account
with respect to equity concerns. Applied work on the impact of green tax reforms on low-
income housholds include Metcalf (1999), West (2005), Ekins and Dresner (2004), and Rausch
et al. (2011). From a theoretical perspective, the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation is not
aUected by these considerations – at least under the separability assumptions employed in
this paper. While the next section Vnds a dependency of optimal tax levels on the desire to
redistribute, the relationship has nothing to do with regressivity.
4.2. Comparative Statics of Pigouvian Taxation
A tax system  is said to implement allocation A if A is the result of individually op-
timal behaviour given . The formal requirement is A = (CL();DL();YL();CH();
DH();YH()), where the right-hand side is deVned by (8).
This subsection examines the comparative statics properties of the greenness of tax sys-
tems which implements the Vrst- and second-best allocation, respectively. The greenness g
10depends only on e and . While the former is an exogenous constant, the latter is endoge-
nously determined and drives the results.
Proposition 1 (First-best Pigouvian taxation). Let F be a tax system that implements the
Vrst-best allocation AF. Then the greenness gF of the tax system is uniquely determined and







Recall from (7) that the cost of public funds at a Vrst-best allocation are F = (1  
)=(wH(1   )) and are determined by a welfare-weighted output increase of high-types.
If  increases, SP cares less about high-types working more and tax revenues generated by
g are less valuable per unit so that more (marginal) revenues need to be collected at the
optimum. If  is increased, the generic high-type has to work more for an higher overall
output requirement and cost of public funds increase. Marginal revenues generated by g
now have higher value per unit and less is needed to satisfy optimality condition (9).
Proposition 2 (Second-best Pigouvian taxation). Let  be a tax system that implements an
interior Vrst-best allocation A. Then the greenness g of the tax system is uniquely determined







From (6) the costs of public funds at a second-best allocation are  = =wL + (1  
)=wH. As  does not depend on , neither does g. The higher the welfare weight of
low-type agents, the more redistribution is asked for and the more distortions are accepted.
Higher distortions imply higher excess burden of taxation and thereby higher cost of public
funds. Marginal revenues from Pigouvian taxation are then more valuable and less marginal
revenue is needed to satisfy optimality condition (9).
Proposition 3. Let g be the greenness of a tax system that implements an interior second-best





Proof. (7) and (6) imply    F > 0 through Assumption 1. g < gF follows from (9) .
Pigouvian taxation is higher in Vrst-best because cost of public funds are lower.
This section has highlighted a link between Pigouvian taxation and the degree of redistribu-
tion measured by the welfare weight . Welfare optimising societies with diUerent opinions
about equity need to have diUerent levels of Pigouvian taxation, even if Vrst-best instru-
ments are feasible. This is not entirely obvious because in basic partial equilibrium models,
the level of Pigouvian taxation is pinned down solely by Pareto eXciency. While Pareto
eXciency is a widely accepted goal, there is no consensus about the “right” level of equity,
11in particular if equity-eXciency trade-oUs are present. This gives rise to the question whe-
ther a society that does not agree on a particular  or has ideological objections against any
redistribution of income can nevertheless agree on some Pigouvian taxation to deal with an
externality. Put diUerently, what is the optimal policy that avoids transfers between agents?
The next section gives an answer to this question.
5. A Transfer-Free Allocation
The major exercise of this paper is to Vnd out the relation between optimal internalisation
and distributive concerns. This section tries to focus solely on eXciency by dropping the
possibility of redistributing income. Consider a social planner who is aware of the externa-
lity and wants to internalise it with Pigouvian taxation, but objects to (monetary) transfers
between agents. Such a situation will be deVned by requiring an allocation to be transfer-
free. To avoid the question who should pay the cost of running government, this section
presumes that these costs are zero, i.e., r = 0.
DeVnition 2. An allocation A is called transfer-free if
YL = pCCL + pDDL and YH = pCCH + pDDH:
From a political-economy perspective, such a requirement makes sense if agents have
veto rights and care predominantly about the monetary implications of a proposed reform
rather than their environmental beneVts. The media often provide Vgures about who wins
or looses from a particular proposal in terms of monetary consequences. These “hard” facts
might be more relevant for voters than predicted long-term or environmental eUects which
are hard to measure. Also, reforms involving monetary transfers may be opposed just for
ideological reasons. From a theoretical perspective, a transfer-free allocation is interesting
because it is as close as possible to the laissez-faire allocation while still internalising the
externality.
Overall, the requirement tries to rule out distributive issues in the design of an environ-
mental policy. The analysis, however, shows that the optimal transfer-free allocation is not
pinned down by Pareto EXciency. It thereby reinforces the claim that environmental policy
cannot be separated from welfare judgments.
Lemma 1. If Atf is an allocation that maximises the welfare function W(A) = UL(A) +














pD + ewH(1   )=(1   )
pC
:
Proof. Straightforward Lagrangian optimisation.
The main message from the Lemma is that the optimal transfer-free allocation depends
on welfare weight  as well as on the population share . Furthermore, the marginal rates
of substitution between consumption goods diUer for the two types.
12At Vrst glance, the results look surprising. By construction, the transfer-free optimum
is expected to be independent of welfare judgements. Also, all previously analysed optima
featured identical marginal rates of substitutions. To outline the intuition behind the results,
consider the simple case of pC = pD = 1. Consumption of DL creates a net beneVt for
the group of low-type agents, taking into account the internal externality it imposes on the
group itself. In addition it imposes an external externality on the group of high-type agents.
The trade-oU between the beneVts of the group L and the external externality on group H
requires a welfare judgement. Group H dislikes group L’s consumption of D, but is not
able to pay them for reducing DL. To be more concrete, consider the marginal eUects of
increasing DL (and accordingly YL):
Internal-external eUect on a generic low-type: uL
D   1=wL   e.
External-external eUect on a generic high-type:  e.
The marginal eUect on welfare is (uL
D 1=wL e)+(1 )( e) and must equal zero









If  is higher, then the external-external eUect is less important and group L should be
allowed to consume more of the dirty good. If  is higher, the bigger group size of group L
implies a higher external-external eUect and group L should consume less of the dirty good.
To be even clearer about what is going on, suppose  goes to one. Then DH should be very
low because the consumption utility it creates is weighted by only 1     0, while the
external-external eUect weighs close to one. On the other hand, DL may be high because
the external-external eUect can be neglected. With no monetary transfer allowed, regulation
of DL;DH is the only way to distribute utility among the two type agents. It is, however, an
ineXcient way as the next Lemma reveals.
Lemma 2. Let wH(1   ) 6= (1   )wL. Then the optimal transfer-free allocation Atf is
not Pareto-eXcient.
The statement can be proofed explicitly, but the result also becomes clear if one appre-
ciates the fact that the constraint of A being transfer-free is more restrictive than the ordi-
nary resource constraint (2) with r = 0, and that the optimal transfer-free allocation does
not satisfy the eXciency condition (5) for optimal internalisation.6
The discussion shows that requiring allocations to be transfer-free is not a very good idea
in the Vrst place. Not only does it fail in providing an internalisation policy that is free
from welfare judgements, but it is also Pareto-dominated by an allocation that allows for
monetary transfers. From a political or ideological perspective, a transfer-free allocation
might be appealing, but from a welfare perspective it is not.
6For a formal proof that works for all parameter ranges, consider a small perturbation around Atf that is
feasible and holds one type’s utility constant. Then show that the other type’s utility can be increased.
136. Conclusion
This paper looks at the interdependency of distributive and environmental policies from a
normative perspective. It is obvious that if agents have diUerent tastes for environmental
protection, the optimal policy depends on distributional considerations. To reduce these
kinds of eUects, all agents are modelled to be as homogeneous as possible. This is hence not
meant to be a simpliVcation, but rather is necessary to isolate the eUects that actually are of
interest.
As a consequence, the structure of the model parallels those of previous contributions,
which Vnd that the rules for environmental taxes do not discriminate between agents and
look the same for Vrst- and second-best settings. Normally, Vrst-best worlds do not suUer
from a conWict between equity and eXciency, and one might be tempted to conclude that
in these settings there is no real interdependency between environmental and distributive
goals.
This paper, however, shows that the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation indeed depends
on distributive goals and that this dependency crucially is down to whether Vrst- or second-
best instruments are available. It thus argues that it is not possible to separate the two task
of redistribution and environmental protection. It strengthens the point by showing that a
society that does not want to intervene in the income distribution will nonetheless need to
make a welfare judgement. Moreover, Pareto eXciency requires monetary transfers between
agents.
What can be learned in terms of policy implications? First, the view that the two goals
of redistribution and environmental protection can be addressed independently by means
of two diUerent instruments (income tax and Pigouvian taxation) needs to be reconsidered.
In particular, the designer of environmental taxes has to account for the value in terms of
welfare that is created by the tax revenues. To determine the optimal level of taxation (and
pollution), the designer has to trade external harm oU against useful tax revenues. Yet, and
this is the second point, the optimum is pinned down by looking at the revenues from the
last unit of pollution, i.e., the marginal revenues. Total revenues in contrast are irrelevant
for the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation. Environmental taxation does not have a general
function to shift the tax burden from labour income to externalities. The designer of the
income tax system just takes total revenues from environmental taxes as given and adjust
the total revenue requirements accordingly.
A
A. Properties of First- and Second-Best Allocation
Lemma 3. If AF is a solution to the Vrst-best problem under Assumption 1, then Y F
L = 0 and
Y F
H > 0.
Proof. Suppose Y F
L > 0. If the total output of all low-type agents is lowered by  2
(0;Y F
L ), every low-type individual may reduce his own output by =. The immediate
14welfare gain is =(wL). To Vnance the output reduction high types have to increase
their total output by  resp. their individual output by =(1   ). The immediate wel-
fare loss is (1   )=((1   )wH). The net eUect of the alteration is strictly positive given
Assumption 1, a contradiction.
Hence Y F
L = 0 and Y F
H > 0 need to holds given the Inada-conditions on u.
Lemma 4. If A is a solution to the second-best problem, then
1. At most one incentive compatibility constraint is binding.
2. YH > YL and uH > uL.
Proof. 1. Suppose the contrary. Summation of both ICs yields YL = YH and u(CL;DL) =
u(CH;DH). Due to the shape of u, this can be optimal only if (CL;DL) = (CL;DL).
To complete the argument, it suXces to show that such a bunching allocation is domi-
nated by a constrained laissez-faire allocation. Fix any feasible bunching allocation Ab =




 ) := argmax C;Yfu(C;Db)  
Y=w s.t. Y  pCC + pDDb + rg. Then, in particular, u(C
lf
 ;Db)   Y lf=w  u(Cb;Db)  








H ). Thus there exist 
such that u(C
lf
 ;Db) Y lf=w > u(Cb;Db) Y b=w. The constraint laissez-faire allocation
Alf thereby Pareto-dominates the bunching allocation Ab. Alf is also incentive compatible
and feasible. Hence, Ab cannot be a solution to the second-best problem and the contradic-
tion is completed. (The argument builds on Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2010, Lemma 1)
2. Add both ICs to obtain YH  YL. Equality would imply a bunching allocation which is
not optimal as shown above. Hence YH > YL. ICH then implies uH > uL.
Lemma 5. If A is an interior solution of the second best problem under Assumption 1, then
high types’ incentive constraint (4) is binding, low types’ incentive constraint (3) is slack.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (4) was slack, i.e., uH   YH=wH > uL   YL=wL. Then
there exits an  > 0 such that also uH   (YH + )=wH > uL   (YL   (1   )=)=wL.
The -perturbed allocation is constructed in a way to keep total output constant. Incentive













dW is strictly positive precisely under Assumption 1, hence a contradiction.
If ICH is binding then ICL must be slack by Lemma 4.
First-Order Conditions
Considering the lemmas, an appropriate Lagrangian is as follows.
L = [u(CL;DL)   YL=wL   (DL + (1   )DH)e]
+ (1   )[u(CH;DH)   YH=wH   (DL + (1   )DH)e]
+ ((YL   pCCL   pDDL) + (1   )(YH   pCCH   pDDH)   r)
+ (u(CH;DH)   YH=wH   u(CL;DL) + YL=wH)
+ YL
(10)
15Next, set the partial derivatives to zero.
u
L
C   pC   u
L
C = 0 , (   )u
L
C = pC (11)
u
L
D   pD   u
L
D   e = 0 , (   )u
L
D = pD + e (12)
 =wL +  + =wH +  = 0 ,  = =wL   =wH    (13)
(1   )u
H
C   (1   )pC + u
H
C = 0 , (1    + )u
H
C = (1   )pC (14)
(1   )u
H
D   (1   )pD + u
H
D   (1   )e = 0 , (1    + )u
H
D = (1   )(pD + e)
(15)


















For a Vrst best optimum, set  = 0, for an interior second best optimum, set  = 0.
Proposition 4 (First-best allocation). An allocation AF is a Vrst-best solution given Assump-


























































Low-type agents do not work at all. Due to linear disutility from working, Assumption 1
implies that any given amount of output requirement fosters lower aggregated disutility if
it is provided solely by high types rather than low types. If YL could be negative, welfare
would be unbounded.
For a moment, ignore the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint F. Then
consumption of high types is independent of the welfare weight and the population shares,
and is just determined by eXciency considerations. It departs from standard results only
through a corrective element that takes care of the external eUects of dirty-good consump-
tion. The consumption levels of the low-type agents, though, heavily depend on welfare
weights as well as the population shares. The underlying trade-oU lies between consump-
tion utility of low-types and disutility of high types, who have to work for the provision of
low-type consumption. Low-type productivity wL is irrelevant for the allocation given that
they do not work.
16Proof of proposition 4. With  = 0, the Lagrange function (10) is concave and the Vrst order
conditions are necessary and suXcient for a solution.









   > 0 ) Y
F
L = 0:
Notice that the inequality is satisVed if and only if Assumption 1 holds. The statements of
the Proposition now follow from conditions (11), (12), (14), (15), and the binding resource
constraint (2).
Lemma 6. Let u(C;D) be strictly concave and continuously diUerentiable and let kC;kD be
two constants such that the system uC(C;D) = kC; uD(C;D) = kD has a solution. Then the
solution is unique.
Proof. Consider the three-dimensional space. Let s = (sC;sD) be a solution. The tangential
plane at S = (sC;sD;u(s)) is spanned by the directions of the two partial derivatives at S.
As u is strictly concave, the whole range of u – except u(s) – lies below that plane. Now
consider a point s0 that also solves the above system but is diUerent from s. The tangential
plane at s0 is parallel to the one at s, yet one of the plane is higher than the other. But than
it is no longer possible that the whole range of u lies below the lower plane. This creates a
contradiction.
Proposition 5 (Interior second-best allocation). If A is an interior solution of the second-


























































 = (1   )
wH
wL
  (1   ): (24)
Theconditionsforhigh-typeconsumptionlevelsarealmostidenticaltothecorresponding
Vrst-best conditions (19). The subtle but important diUerence lies in the Lagrangian multi-
plier , which is diUerent in Vrst- and second-best and, most importantly, features diUerent
comparative statics properties.
Theconsumptionlevelsoflowtypesaredistorteddownwards, i.e., thelabour-consumption
choice is distorted in favour of leisure. The distortion is captured by d and is higher if  is
higher or the diUerence in productivities is larger.
17Proof of proposition 5. If A is an interior second-best solution, then it satisVes conditions
(13) and (16) with  set to zero. Then  and  are uniquely determined and strictly positive.
For given values of  and , (11), (14), (12), and (15) uniquely determine the consumption
levels (uniqueness is established by Lemma 6). Output requirements follow from the binding
resource constraint (2) combined with the binding incentive constraint (4).
B. Taxation and Implementation
DeVnition 3. A tax system  = (tC;tD;T()) speciVes constant speciVc tax rates for the two
consumption goods and an income tax function T. Resulting consumer prices are denoted
by qC := pC + tC and qD := pD + tD.
There is no need to relax the linearity of commodity taxes. First- and second-best allo-
cations can be implemented with a system that features linear consumption taxes. In the
Vrst-best case, the income tax may be conditioned on the type of an agent, whereas under
information constraints, the income tax does depend only on Y .
DeVnition 4. A tax system  = (tC;tD;T()) is said to implement allocation A if
1. Forany, (C;D;Y) 2 argmax (C;D;Y )fu(C;D) Y=w s.t. qCC+qDD  Y  T()g
2. (YL   pCCL   pDDL) + (1   )(YH   pCCH   pDDH)   r  0.
A tax system with linear commodity taxes can only implement allocations in which the
marginalratesofsubstitutionbetweenthetwoconsumptiongoodareequalacrossallagents.









Proof. The individual choices (C();D();Y())as deVned in (8) satisfy the Vrst-order
conditions u
C = qC=w, and u
D = qD=w. It follows that u
D=u
C = qD=qC.
Lemma 8. There exists a tax system  = (tC;tD;T) with T : (w;Y ) 7! T(w;Y ) that







Proof. Fix some tC;tD such that qD=qC = (pD + e=F)=pC. DeVne the income tax function
for w 2 fwL;wHg to be
T(w;Y ) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
Y w = wL; and Y 6= 0
 (qCCF
L + qDDF









H); w = wH and Y = Y F
H
We show that an agent who solves the individual maximisation problem (8) chooses
exactly the bundle that is intended for his or her type.
18(a) Low types. For low-type agents it is never optimal to choose Y 6= 0. So their problem
reduces to maxC;D u(C;D) s.t qCC + qDD  qCCF
L + qDDF
L. Necessary and suXcient
conditions for a solution are uD=uC = qD=qC and qCC + qDD = qCCF
L + qDDF
L. By
construction, the Vrst-best consumption levels (CF
L;DF
L) satisfy these conditions.
(b) High types. For high-type agents, it is never optimal to choose Y 6= Y F
H . So their
problem reduces to maxC;D u(C;D) s.t qCC + qDD  qCCF
H + qDDF
H. Necessary and suX-
cient conditions for a solution are uD=uC = qD=qC and qCC + qDD = qCCF
H + qDDF
H. By
construction the Vrst best consumption levels (CF
H;DF
H) satisfy these conditions.
Lemma 9. There exists a tax system with T : Y 7! T(Y ) that implements the second-best







Proof. Fix some tC;tD such that qD=qC = (pD + e=)=pC. DeVne the income tax function





TL; Y = Y 
L
TH; Y = Y 
H
Y otherwise
where T = Y   qCC
   qDD
.
An agent who faces the individual maximisation problem deVned in (8) will never choose
Y 62 fY 
L;Y 
Hg. Thus the agents’ problem can be decomposed into two steps: (1) ^ u(B) :=
maxC;D u(C;D) s.t. qCC + qDD = B. (2) maxY ^ u(B)   Y=w s.t. [B = (Y 
L   TL) if Y =
Y 
L;B = (Y 
H   TH) if Y = Y 
H; and B = 0 otherwise].
Necessary and suXcient conditions for a solution of step (1) are uD=uC = qD=qC and
qCC + qDD = B. By construction the conditions are met by (C
L;D
L) if B = Y 
L   TL and
by (C
H;D
H) if B = Y 







H). As the second-best allocation satisVes the incentive com-
patibility constraints (4) and (3), each agent does indeed choose the bundle intended for his
or her type.
Proof Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1. From Proposition 4 and Lemma 7 MRS = pD=pC + e=(FpC) =
qD=qC. It follows that e=F = tC   tCqD=qC = g. From (7) F = (1   )=(wH(1   )) and
the results follow simply by taking derivatives.
Proof of Proposition 2. From Proposition 5 and Lemma 7 MRS = pD=pC + e=(pC) =
qD=qC. It follows that e= = tC   tCqD=qC = g. From (24)  = =wL + (1   )=wH) and
the results follow simply by taking derivatives.
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